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Aristotle
In the De anima Aristotle introduces the astonishing claim that we come to grasp intelligible objects through a kind of reception. 4 These objects have the power to be grasped and this power is actualised when a sufficient amount of perceptual experience has been stored in our non-rational memory (cf. An. post. II 19). 5 This means that if we want to say that according to Aristotle intelligible objects are abstracted from perceptual experience, we should avoid saying that we abstract them. To say so would suggest that our intellect somehow works on the perceptual material to abstract intelligibility from it.
Aristotle gives no hint that our intellect should somehow interpret perceptual data to abstract intelligibility from objects. Rather, he emphasises the pure receptivity on our part. 6 He also makes clear that before our intellect comes to grasp intelligible objects for the first time, it is nothing actual and does not have any nature of its own except for its potentiality (De an. III 4, 429a22-24). In the same chapter (III 4, 429a18-21), he argues that if the intellect had a nature, this nature would prevent it from grasping some objects. Because intellect can grasp anything, it cannot have a nature of its own.
There are basically two ways of understanding Aristotle's argument here. 7 To present the two readings we need to recollect that Aristotle analyses the intellectual apprehension of simple intelligible objects in the way that when we grasp such an object, our intellect becomes identical in form with the object (cf. III 4, 429b6). Now, the first reading of the argument would be the following. Given that we grasp intelligible objects so that our intellect becomes identical in form with them, our intellect could not grasp itself because it could never become what it already is. Another way to take the argument would be to say that the intellect cannot have a nature of its own, because this nature would prevent it from becoming completely identical in form with something else. On this second reading, the basic idea of the argument is to say that the intellect form to perceiving, which is elsewhere characterised as reception of the perceptible form without matter (see, e.g. De an. II 12, 424a18-19; cf. 424b2; III 2, 425b22-23, III 4, 429a13-18, III 12, 434a29). 5 In the Middle Ages the theory that our intellect is in this way perfected by lower cognitive capacities of perception and memory was taken to be problematic. Aquinas rejected the assumption that the active intellect should be a divine agent. By contrast, it must be taken as human. However, if we assume that the active intellect is there to perfect our intellect, we run into the assumption Aristotle opposes in Posterior Analytics II 19 that such a high cognitive function would remain unnoticed in us. If we assume that the active intellect is not there from the very beginning, we need to explain how it got there and when. 6 It has not been highlighted in the scholarly literature that Aristotle also refers in passing to the passivity or receptivity of the human intellect in Posterior Analytics II 19. After explaining briefly-with a somewhat obscure analogy of soldiers turning around and returning to their original order-how universals are got from perception, he says that our soul is such that all this can happen to it ( α δ νασ αι π σ ειν τ τ , 100a14). So the universal contents in our reason Aristotle is talking about are not produced or laboriously abstracted by us; they simply come to our mind from the world and our soul receives them.
